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In “Qualia in a Contemporary Neurobiologi-
cal Perspective” (2015), Korf tackles the peren-
nial issue of qualia in the philosophy of mind. 
His discussion is partly a response to Chalm-
ers’ (1996) hard problem, which, as evidenced 
by other recent discussions in Dialogues (Earp, 
2012; Soleiman, 2015), remains fresh after near-
ly two decades. Korf highlights the importance 
of regarding each brain as a particular shaped 
by unique contingencies and suggests how neu-
robiological research might proceed in light of 
this. However, I argue that his discussion does 
not address what is at the core of Chalmers’ hard 
problem, and so fails to bridge the gap between 
neurobiological processes and qualia.
To explicate Chalmers’ argument, physical 
processes in the brain do not go on “in the dark”, 
but are accompanied by fi rst-person subjective 
experience. No amount of third-person physi-
cal information about the structure and dynam-
ics of a system entails this fi rst-person subjec-
tive experience. Its existence, then, remains an 
extra fact beyond the complete physical facts. 
Therefore, physicalism is false, dualism is true, 
and consciousness is ontologically fundamental. 
Interestingly, a variant of this argument has re-
cently been used to show that neutral monism 
is false by highlighting the failure of entailment 
from neutral non-phenomenal facts to phenom-
enal facts (Blamauer, 2013).
The crux of the hard problem, then, is that sub-
jective experience cannot be reduced to objec-
tive properties, hence Chalmers’ contention that 
qualia cannot be explained by neurobiology. In 
a response partly reminiscent of Dennett (1988), 
Korf suggests that the unique developmental 
trajectories of individual brains might provide 
insight into the apparent idiosyncracies of qua-
lia. However, this misses the point. The problem 
presented by Chalmers is not why the fl avour of 
a quale eludes characterisation by general laws, 
but why a neurobiological process should be ac-
companied by subjective experience at all. Per-
haps this refl ects Korf’s confl ation of two senses 
of “subjective”. When he talks about “individual 
and subjective infl uences on brain neurophysiol-
ogy” (p.44), he appears to be talking about those 
idiosyncratic infl uences that pertain to a specifi c 
person’s brain. However, when Chalmers talks 
about the “subjective quality of experience” 
(Chalmers, 1996, p.4), he means the fi rst-person 
ontology of conscious experience. The former 
sense does not entail the other. Hence, even if 
individual brains are unique, as Korf convinc-
ingly argues, this does not provide any reason 
why these brains should be accompanied by con-
scious experiences.
A second critical point concerns Korf’s sug-
gestion that experience is “an emergent brain 
process” (p.42). He appeals to Searle’s (1992) 
liquidity example to support this. However, he 
seems to have overlooked Chalmers’ response 
that this is a false analogy. Although liquidity 
may not seem obvious from the study of indi-
vidual H2O molecules, it is nonetheless entailed 
by their physical properties:
“Given all the microphysical facts about a particular 
batch of H2O, it is logically impossible that those 
facts could hold without liquidity being instanti-
ated” (Chalmers, 1996, p.130). 
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The presence of qualia, on the other hand, is 
not entailed by physical facts about structure and 
dynamics, as highlighted by the conceivabil-
ity argument. Therefore, subjective experience 
brings something ontologically novel into the 
picture in a way that liquidity does not.
Overall, Korf’s paper is an insightful explora-
tion of how the processing of sensory informa-
tion is shaped by autobiographical contingencies 
that are unique to the individual brain. However, 
the hard problem of why such processing is ac-
companied by experience at all is not resolved. 
And so, the discussion falls short of providing an 
account of qualia.
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